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1. Introduction
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the preeminent 
national professional accounting association in the United States (U.S.) and, by its own 
pronouncements, maintains and enforces the profession’s most widely applicable code of 
professional conduct (CPC). Jenkins et al. (2018) recently found that the AICPA relies heavily 
on state boards of accountancy (i.e., licensing bodies) to help monitor the adherence of 
accountants to its CPC, as state boards reported more than one-third of CPC-related violations 
that resulted in AICPA sanctions from 2008 to 2013.1 Indeed, any failure in this monitoring 
stands to threaten those who rely on information prepared or certified by accountants. To 
achieve a uniform set of behavioral standards across the profession, the AICPA encourages state 
boards to adopt its CPC (AICPA, 2015a). For state boards that adopt, there is an implicit 
obligation to report CPC violations to the AICPA for centralized aggregation and analysis. 
Because state boards can choose to fully, partially, or not adopt the AICPA’s CPC, it remains an 
open question to what extent a state board’s reporting of violations to the AICPA is associated 
with its degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC. Our study seeks to answer this question by 
examining violation reporting levels of U.S. state boards of accountancy to the AICPA.2 Based 
on our findings, we offer commentary on the current role of state boards in the national effort to 
monitor CPC-related violations, highlight key public policy implications, and offer suggestions 
for improvement.
1 For expositional purposes, we will refer to the boards of accountancy of the 50 U.S. states as simply “state boards 
of accountancy” or “boards of accountancy” or “state boards” or “boards.” In doing so, we acknowledge that some 
states may not refer to such a body as a board of accountancy, although it serves in largely the same capacity.
2 The AICPA can become aware of violations identified by state boards of accountancy through direct 
communications from state boards or by reviewing state board publications. For expositional purposes, when we 
refer to state boards reporting violations to the AICPA, we are collectively referring to situations in which a state 
board (1) directly communicates violations to the AICPA or (2) indirectly communicates this information through 
other outlets (e.g., publications) that the AICPA can review. Where appropriate, we make specific reference to the 
method used. 
2
Previous studies have examined enforcement of the CPC and its role in the accounting 
profession. Beyond Jenkins et al. (2018), there is a stream of research that examines the extent 
to which codes of conduct/ethics protect the public interest or the private interests of the 
accounting profession (e.g., Loeb, 1972; Parker, 1987, 1994; Schaefer and Welker, 1994; 
Bédard, 2001; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2001, 2003). Another prominent stream of research 
documents common problems with accountants’ conduct and associated sanctions under the 
CPC (e.g., Tidrick, 1992; Badawi and Rude, 1995, 1997; Moriarity, 2000; Badawi, 2002; 
Armitage and Moriarity, 2016; Jenkins et al. 2018). There is also research that examines codes 
of ethics and self-regulation in the accounting profession (e.g., Loeb, 1984, 1986). However, 
these streams of research do not consider the logistics of monitoring a national accounting 
profession as large as the one in the U.S., in which 55 states and territories have independent 
boards of accountancy that may report violations to the AICPA. In one regard, having state 
boards spread throughout the country should ensure close monitoring of all accounting 
professionals. However, state boards may vary in their level of participation in reporting 
violations for various reasons, such as (a lack of) adoption of the AICPA’s CPC, budget 
constraints, or views on the types of violations that are reportable to the AICPA.
We examine the extent to which a state board’s reporting of violations to the AICPA is 
associated with its degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC. If a state board willingly chooses to 
adopt the AICPA’s CPC either in whole or in part, there is an implicit obligation to report 
violations of the CPC to the AICPA. State boards that do not adopt the CPC do not have this 
implicit obligation and are more likely to remain disengaged from the AICPA’s efforts to 
monitor the accounting profession under a common framework and to centrally aggregate 
misconduct issues. Still, there is research that suggests adoption (on its own) might not be 
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associated with higher levels of violation reporting. For example, Adam and Rachman-Moore 
(2004) find that an effective code of conduct implementation requires informal buy-in from 
constituents. 
To determine the extent to which a state board’s reporting of violations to the AICPA is 
associated with its degree of AICPA CPC adoption, we evaluate state boards’ reporting of 
violations from 2008 to 2016 along with their degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC. In doing 
so, we collected data from a variety of sources including (1) online resources (both public and 
privileged resources), (2) the AICPA and National Association of State Boards of Accountancy 
(NASBA), and (3) through inquiries of the state boards. Descriptive analyses reveal inconsistent 
and non-uniform monitoring, enforcement, and reporting by state boards under the AICPA’s 
CPC. Further, the number of violations reported by state boards does not appear to be merely an 
artifact of the number of CPAs in a state or the state population, and there do not appear to be 
regional differences in the reporting of violations. We also find that state boards that partially 
adopt the AICPA’s CPC report the most violations. States with full adoption appear to be less 
engaged in helping the AICPA monitor the conduct of accounting professionals, and tend to 
have smaller operating budgets, particularly when compared to states with partial adoption of 
the AICPA’s CPC. Finally, we conduct a regression analysis to assess the impact of factors that 
might explain variation in the number of violations reported to the AICPA. Overall our findings 
suggest that widespread full adoption of the AICPA’s CPC by state boards might not result in 
enhanced participation in reporting violations to the AICPA as might otherwise be expected. 
That is, we do not find evidence that violation reporting follows naturally from an adoption of 
the AICPA’s CPC. As such, we believe the AICPA should more strongly emphasize to state 
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boards the importance of reporting CPC violations and “buying into” enhanced monitoring of 
misconduct. 
Our study is important for several reasons. First, the AICPA encourages state boards to 
adopt its CPC, as nationwide adoption would align all CPAs under the same framework for 
ethical and behavioral standards (AICPA, 2015a). While adoption of the CPC should come with 
an implicit obligation for state boards to monitor misconduct and report violations to the 
AICPA, we find inconsistent reporting by state boards both within and across adoption statuses 
(i.e., none, partial, or full adoption of the CPC). This finding is unexpected because violations 
should be more evenly distributed across time and location. Thus, our findings suggest that state 
board adoption of the AICPA’s CPC, on its own, is not sufficient to achieve more active or 
uniform state board reporting. Further, the observed inconsistencies in state board reporting 
contributes to the broader issue that no single party has a comprehensive understanding of the 
misconduct of accounting professionals across the U.S. We emphasize that regulating CPA 
behavior is important for the overall social good (i.e., protecting the public interest), and a 
failure to monitor adherence to the CPC by state boards threatens a wide spectrum of users of 
accounting information as well as the inner-workings of the accounting profession (including its 
ability to self-regulate) because misconduct may not be detected or corrected. According to 
James W. Brackens, Jr., Vice President - Ethics and Practice Quality for the AICPA, 
consequences to the AICPA and the profession include inconsistent or uneven sanctions against 
CPAs for the same violation, less effective peer review processes, and inadequate educational 
materials related to the CPC. Thus, we highlight an important public policy issue in the 
potential for inconsistent monitoring and enforcement of the AICPA CPC through non-uniform 
reporting of violations by boards of accountancy. The AICPA can use these findings to inform 
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efforts to encourage state boards to both adopt its CPC and commit to a program of active 
monitoring and reporting of violations. Finally, we call for more transparency into the effective 
use of state board operating budgets.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of 
past research in the area and present our research question. Next, we describe our methodology. 
The penultimate section presents our findings. We conclude with a discussion of our findings 
and policy implications.
2. Background
2.1. The AICPA and state boards of accountancy
The AICPA serves the accounting profession a number of ways, one of which includes 
providing and maintaining the only national-level CPC for accountants practicing in the U.S. 
While the AICPA CPC provides a common set of ethical standards applicable to a wide range 
of professional accounting services, the AICPA faces challenges in implementing and 
monitoring adherence to its CPC. For example, the initial licensing and continued maintenance 
(i.e., periodic renewal) of the CPA designation are controlled at the state board of accountancy 
level and neither requires membership in the AICPA.3 Indeed, professional certification only 
requires CPAs to demonstrate fluency with the code of ethics adopted by the licensing board in 
the state(s) they wish to maintain certification.4 CPAs are therefore not automatically subject to 
3 Still, the AICPA reports a current membership of 418,000 (AICPA, 2018a).
4 Many state boards of accountancy require CPA candidates to complete a course on ethics but there is variation in 
what those courses cover and associated requirements for ethics-specific CPE hours. While such courses may cover 
state-specific rules and professional standards, content may also cover elements of the AICPA CPC. Further, many 
states also require continuing professional education (CPE) training in ethics or professional standards, and failure 
to comply can result in the suspension or revocation of CPA licensure.
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the AICPA’s CPC.5 To combat this challenge the AICPA encourages state boards to adopt its 
CPC (in whole or in part) and report related instances of member violations (AICPA, 2015a). 
As of July 2015, 31 states had partially or fully adopted the AICPA CPC (15 partial; 16 full) 
(AICPA, 2015b).6 In this study, we examine trends in state boards’ of accountancy reporting of 
CPC-related violations to the AICPA, along with other state/state board attributes, and seek to 
answer to what extent a state boards’ degree of AICPA CPC adoption is associated with 
different levels of participation in the national effort to monitor the misconduct of accounting 
professionals under a common set of ethical standards.
Violation reporting is used by the AICPA for a number of purposes such as developing 
educational programs and outreach activities, determining appropriate disciplinary sanctions for 
CPC violations, and assisting professionals who conduct peer reviews in planning their reviews. 
This reporting affords the AICPA access to information about the breadth and nature of CPC 
violations across the profession that is necessary to accomplish each of these purposes and to 
enable the AICPA to maintain, and revise as necessary, a code of conduct that embodies “the 
profession’s recognition of its responsibilities to the public, to clients [emphasis in the original], 
and to colleagues” (AICPA, 2016, 5). The cost of failures in such reporting is borne by the 
public (e.g., creditors, governments, employers, investors, and the business and financial 
communities), clients, and members of the profession itself.
There are two significant consequences of inadequate violation reporting by state boards 
according to James W. Brackens, Jr., the AICPA’s Vice President - Ethics and Practice Quality. 
5 However, the Uniform Accountancy Act promotes the AICPA CPC as the model against which CPAs’ ethical 
conduct should be measured in the U.S. (AICPA, 2014).
6 We use the CPC adoption status of states as of July 2015, the earliest point at which the AICPA began tracking 
adoption by jurisdictions. However, data that is more recent is available from the AICPA. See: 
http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/State/Pages/AdoptingtheAICPACodeofProfessionalConduct.aspx.
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First, the AICPA cannot take effective remedial action against a CPA if it is unaware of the 
individual’s misconduct and the circumstances surrounding it. While state boards may take their 
own action against a CPA, individuals in one jurisdiction may receive one type of sanction (e.g., 
additional continuing professional education requirements) while an individual in another 
jurisdiction may face a different sanction (e.g., a civil penalty or temporary suspension of the 
CPA license). AICPA sanctions are not limited by state or federal statutes and can be modified 
in a manner that is believed to be most effective at remediating the CPA’s misconduct. In 
exercising this flexibility, the AICPA believes it is able to provide strong public protections 
nationwide. Second, violation reporting is considered a significant factor during the risk 
assessment process in peer reviews. For example, if violation reporting reveals that a CPA has 
been sanctioned by a state board for failing to comply with professional standards on an audit 
engagement (e.g., failing to exercise due care or not complying with annual continuing 
education requirements), then peer reviewers can adjust their approach to examining other 
engagements that fall within the purview of their review. Thus, deficiencies in professional 
services may go undetected if peer reviewers are unaware of CPC violations or related problems 
on past engagements.
Fifty states and five territories in the U.S. maintain a board of accountancy (or 
equivalent), and as such, are relevant in helping the AICPA monitor the accounting profession 
under its CPC (NASBA, 2018a).7 In this study, however, we focus on boards of the 50 U.S. 
states due to the broader availability of supplemental data and given this focus provides over 
98% coverage of licensed CPAs in the U.S. (per data provided by NASBA as of 2016). There 
are two general ways the AICPA is made aware of violations identified by these state boards: 
7 These same 55 states and territories also maintain independent CPA societies (AICPA, 2018c).
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(1) through direct communications from the state boards or (2) indirectly through other outlets 
(e.g., publications) made available by the state boards that identify instances of state 
boards/entities sanctioning members for misconduct. In many cases, state boards will take 
corrective action against a member for misconduct, and upon learning of this action the AICPA 
will automatically impose a similar sanction (Armitage and Moriarity, 2016; Jenkins et al. 
2018). Participation from state boards is therefore critical for the AICPA to compile a 
comprehensive list of CPC violations and to impose appropriate sanctions. However, it remains 
unknown the extent to which state boards’ (degree of) adoption of the AICPA’s CPC is 
associated with different levels of participation in reporting violations to the AICPA.
While prior studies have not analyzed the impact of CPC adoption on violation 
reporting, there are two primary streams of research that have examined enforcement of the 
CPC and its role in the accounting profession.
2.2. Research in accounting on codes of professional conduct
Several studies examine whether a CPC is used to protect the private interest of the 
accounting profession or the broader public interest. Loeb (1972) examined CPC violations and 
related sanctions within one U.S. state from 1905 to 1969 and found more severe sanctions were 
imposed for violations of public rather than private interest matters. Parker (1994) developed a 
five-factor private interest model and demonstrated that the professional accounting ethics code 
in Australia served to protect the profession’s private interests. Canning and O’Dwyer (2001) 
investigated the disciplinary procedures used by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ireland (ICAI) and found such procedures protect the private interests of the accounting 
profession. Bédard (2001) found that public interest violations are deemed more serious and 
carry heavier sanctions for accounting professionals during the open trial stage of disciplinary 
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hearings (in Québec, Canada). Finally, Jenkins et al. (2018) show that sanctions were imposed 
under the AICPA CPC from 2008 to 2013 primarily in defense of the public interest.
Other research examines instances of AICPA CPC violations and resulting sanctions. 
Moriarity (2000) studied AICPA sanctions from 1980 to 1998 and found that members were 
most commonly sanctioned under the CPC as a result of criminal convictions. Tidrick (1992) 
reported similar findings for sanctions imposed from 1980 to 1990. Using a more limited 
sample period from 1994 to 1995, Badawi and Rude (1995, 1997) found that sanctions were 
most commonly the result of substandard professional work. Most recently, Jenkins et al. (2018) 
found sanctions from 2008 to 2013 were most commonly applied for acts discreditable to the 
accounting profession. In terms of specific types of sanctions imposed, Moriarity (2000) found 
suspensions were most often imposed for issues of substandard professional service. Results 
from Tidrick (1992), Badawi and Rude (1995, 1997) and Jenkins et al. (2018) show 
expulsions/terminations to be the most common form of sanction for violations of the AICPA’s 
CPC. As such, this area of research identifies prevalent issues with misconduct and how the 
profession responds with disciplinary sanctions.8
The streams of research just described are important because they help the profession 
understand the most common types of CPC violations, how violations are sanctioned, and how 
accounting CPCs are used (i.e., serving public vs. private interests). However, these studies do 
not examine the level of participation from licensing boards (i.e., state boards of accountancy) 
in providing continuous monitoring of the conduct of accounting professionals, nor whether 
8 We specify here “how the profession responds” as the AICPA commonly imposes sanctions commensurate with 
those imposed by the party that first identified the misconduct, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or state boards of accountancy. We focus this study on state boards of 
accountancy as Jenkins et al. (2018) found that state boards report more violations that lead to AICPA sanctions 
than any other party.
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widespread adoption of a common CPC assists in this endeavor. Indeed, Jenkins et al. (2018) 
found that 35.6 percent (210/590) of AICPA sanctions imposed from 2008 to 2013 were 
originally reported by state boards of accountancy, and remaining sanctions were reported by 
“entities” such as the AICPA, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).9 Therefore, state 
boards play a major role in the AICPA’s effort to identify and report violations of accounting 
professionals across the U.S. Considering there are 50 state boards of accountancy in the U.S. 
that vary in their degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC, it is unlikely that each board 
participates to the same extent in monitoring misconduct, enforcing sanctions, and ultimately 
reporting violations to the AICPA. 
2.3. CPC adoption, monitoring, and enforcement
The AICPA encourages state boards to adopt its CPC because nationwide adoption 
would align all CPAs under the same framework for ethical and behavioral standards (AICPA, 
2015a). Nonetheless, because the AICPA is a voluntary membership organization, state boards 
can choose to fully, partially, or not adopt the AICPA’s CPC as their own. Whichever option a 
state board chooses, ex ante the number of CPC violations that occur should be evenly 
distributed across time periods and states. However, if a state board fully or partially adopts the 
AICPA’s CPC, there is an implicit obligation for that board to report violations of the CPC to 
the AICPA. On the other hand, state boards that do not adopt the CPC do not have this implicit 
obligation and are likely less engaged with the AICPA’s efforts to monitor accounting 
9 We make several references that indicate a state board or entity “reported violations” to the AICPA. Here, we are 
broadly referring to the party who originally identified and communicated/made available through other outlets 
(e.g., publications) the violation that lead to disciplinary sanctions. For example, when we say the AICPA reported 
violations, this does not imply the AICPA reported to itself, but instead the AICPA was the first party to record the 
member violation that lead to disciplinary sanctions under the CPC.
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professionals’ ethical conduct and to centrally aggregate misconduct issues. However, there is 
research that suggests adoption (on its own) might not be associated with higher levels of 
violation reporting, and that violation reporting might also relate to how state boards choose to 
implement monitoring and enforcement (i.e., oversight) activities.
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) discuss the hidden cost of control in a principal-agent model 
and show that as more control is applied by a principal over an agent, the agent perceives that 
action as a sign of distrust and limitation of their choice autonomy. In our study’s context, state 
boards that feel under the control of the AICPA might actually reduce their monitoring 
activities. Similarly, Adam and Rachman-Moore (2004) study the implementation of codes of 
conduct and find that formal methods of adoption are necessary but not sufficient; rather, an 
effective implementation requires both formal and informal buy-in. This suggests that full 
adoption of the AICPA’s CPC (i.e., formal adoption) alone may be less effective than when 
paired with an informal buy-in such as when state boards develop and maintain their own codes 
of conduct alongside the AICPA’s CPC. Together, these findings raise some doubt as to 
whether a state board’s fuller adoption of the AICPA’s CPC is associated with higher levels of 
violation reporting. To summarize, various factors likely influence a state board’s reporting of 
violations to the AICPA. In this study, we focus on one of the more observable relevant factors, 
that being the state boards’ (degree of) adoption of the AICPA’s CPC as it relates to state 
boards reporting violations of the CPC. In doing so, we seek to answer the following research 
question:
RQ:  To what extent is a state board’s reporting of violations to the AICPA associated 
with its degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC?
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Next, we describe the data collected to examine the association between participation in 
reporting violations to the AICPA and state board (degree of) AICPA CPC adoption.
3. Data collection
NASBA recognizes 55 boards of accountancy in the U.S., which include the boards of 
the 50 U.S. states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (NASBA, 2018a). As previously stated, we 
focus on boards in the 50 U.S. states due to the broader availability of supplemental data and 
given this focus provides over 98% coverage of the active CPAs in the U.S.10,11 We collected 
data through three sources: (1) online resources (including both public and privileged 
resources), (2) the AICPA and NASBA, and (3) our inquiries of the state boards of 
accountancy. Next, we describe the data collected through each of these sources.
3.1. Data from online resources
The data we collected from online resources cover a variety of areas. To begin, we 
collected all available state board of accountancy (annual) operating budgets for 2008 to 2016. 
In doing so, we obtained budgets for some/all years in our examined time period for 39 of the 
50 state boards, and ultimately collected 291 state board/year observations.12 Budgets for other 
boards were either unavailable or included in as components of larger budgets with other 
administrative bodies (i.e., umbrella agencies) such that separate board of accountancy 
10 We also chose to focus on the 50 U.S. states as other research has focused on specific nuances found in U.S. 
territories such as Puerto Rico (e.g., Cardona et al. 2019).
11 We rely on the AICPA’s accumulation of state-level violation and sanction information because this same 
information is generally not publicly available from the states. As will be further discussed in Section 3.3, we 
contacted the state boards individually to better understand which states report violations to the AICPA and the 
frequency of this reporting.
12 State boards with no operating budgets for any years in our data include Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin.
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operating budgets could not be separately identified. We also collected state-level annualized 
CPA licensing fees, CPA continuing professional education (CPE) requirements, information on 
whether state boards use the AICPA’s ethics exam or implement their own ethics exam (or a 
combination thereof), state board license renewal periods, CPE reporting periods, and other 
state requirements for licensure (e.g., experience requirements). Further, in recognizing the 
varying economic conditions during our analysis period, we also obtained state-level gross 
domestic product (GDP) data for 2008 to 2016.13 This data is particularly important because our 
study’s period includes three years of the Great Recession (i.e., 2008 to 2010). Finally, we 
obtained the number of public company headquarters, by state and year, from Compustat.
3.2. Data from the AICPA and NASBA
We obtained violations data from the AICPA quarterly compilations of all disciplinary 
sanctions imposed on its members under the CPC for the nine-year period beginning January 
2008 and ending December 2016. In assembling these quarterly compilations, the AICPA lists 
member violations as reported by state boards and other entities, such as the AICPA, SEC, IRS, 
and PCAOB. Further, the AICPA may also become aware of member violations by review of 
state board publications, enforcement releases (from entities), and news articles. Thus, the 
AICPA learns of member violations through (1) state board/entity direct communications and 
(2) other outlets (e.g., publications) made available that identify instances of state 
boards/entities sanctioning members for misconduct.14 We refer to both the direct 
13 This data is publicly available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. See: 
https://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm
14 Prior to November 2009, the AICPA reported disciplinary sanctions in its newsletter, The CPA Letter. Since this 
time, disciplinary sanctions for AICPA members have appeared on the Disciplinary Actions section of the AICPA 
website, and summary listings periodically appear in the Wall Street Journal. The use of online postings 
complicates the process of obtaining and summarizing past member sanctions, as the data are removed after a set 
period of time. We therefore worked with the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Division and obtained copies of the 
original quarterly compilations. In doing so, the AICPA removed member names from each entry, although names 
appear in the original online postings.
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communications, and the making of this information available through other outlets, as the 
“reporting” of member violations. Our data consist of the 358 sanctions the AICPA imposed 
upon members under its CPC from 2008 to 2016 based on conduct violations reported by 35 
state boards (i.e., 15 state boards did not report any violations during this time period).15 These 
358 records represent the complete population of sanctions known by the AICPA during the 
study period.16 Thus, related analyses are not performed on a sample basis.
The AICPA also provided a listing of state boards of accountancy that had fully, 
partially, or not adopted the AICPA CPC as their own as of July 2015. As shown in Table 1, 16 
state boards had fully adopted, 15 had partially-adopted and 19 had not adopted the AICPA 
CPC as of July 2015 (AICPA, 2015b).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Finally, to gauge the relative CPA population by state, we obtained the number of CPA 
licensees per state from NASBA (as of 2016).17
3.3. Data from inquiries of the state boards of accountancy
To gain a more complete perspective on state board participation in CPC monitoring, we 
independently contacted the 50 U.S. state boards of accountancy and inquired as to their 
15 We exclude 146 violations identified as part of a New Jersey audit of practitioner CPE compliance performed 
during 2013. Each of these 146 instances relates to CPE violations, and are excluded from our study because they 
represent the specific enforcement actions of one state.
16 Krom (2019) reports 769 disciplinary actions against CPAs across four states (California, Texas, Illinois, and 
New York) from 2008 to 2014, whereas we report 358 disciplinary actions across the United States from 2008 to 
2016. The difference in these totals is due to the population of interest and data set/sources. Specifically, the 
population in our study is the number of sanctions imposed by the AICPA under its CPC, whereas Krom’s (2019) 
population is the number of disciplinary actions published/publicized by four state boards. Further contributing to 
this difference: (1) the AICPA might not act on a state board’s reported disciplinary action because it does not map 
to the AICPA's CPC, (2) Krom (2019, 574) reports “ricochet” sanctions that appear multiple times in the dataset as 
a single CPA being disciplined by multiple state boards for the same offense, and (3) the burdensome data 
collection process as documented in this study and Krom (2019) makes it possible that the AICPA might not have 
located all the state board disciplinary actions during this time period.
17 This data is not publicly available and was directly requested from NASBA to align with the final year evaluated 
in our data set.
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practices/policies on directly communicating CPC violations to the AICPA. We focused our 
efforts on the boards of accountancy instead of the CPA societies because practitioner licenses 
are board-controlled, membership in CPA societies is voluntary, and there were no violations in 
our dataset reported to the AICPA by any state CPA society. In identifying an appropriate 
representative (e.g., executive director) for each board, we used contact information published 
online by NASBA.18 Each representative was originally contacted by phone, and additional 
follow-up questions were managed through email communication. We asked each 
representative three questions related to their state board’s participation in the AICPA’s efforts 
to monitor the accounting profession at the national level:
1. Does the state board periodically directly communicate CPC violations to the AICPA?
2. How often are CPC violations directly communicated to the AICPA?
3. Which CPC violations are directly communicated to the AICPA?
We obtained responses to our inquiries from 48 of the 50 state boards, but failed to 
receive a response from Illinois and New Jersey. 
Table 2 summarizes results for those boards that directly communicate violations to the 
AICPA.19 We find the 17 boards that claim to directly communicate violations do so with 
varying frequencies, ranging from in real-time as violations occur to once every three years. The 
severity of violations directly communicated also varies, ranging from all known violations to 
18 Access to state boards of accountancy via the NASBA website is available at: http://nasba.org/stateboards/.
19 As previously described, the AICPA can become aware of violations identified by state boards of accountancy 
through direct communications from state boards or by reviewing state board publications. With our dataset, it is 
not possible to determine which of these two methods was used to identify each of the 358 violations made 
available by state boards from 2008 to 2016. However, our inquiries with the AICPA indicate that there are only 
four state boards that directly communicate violations on a consistent basis: Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, and 
Wisconsin. Our inquiries with state boards help reveal the reporting practices followed at the individual state 
boards of accountancy level.
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only those considered by the state board to be “serious.”20 Our findings indicate there is no 
consistent reporting mechanism in place at the state board of accountancy level for the AICPA 
to be made aware of all instances of member CPC violations. Consequently, the AICPA’s 
ability to monitor accounting professionals on a national level is limited. Further, in considering 
the adoption status of the 17 state boards that directly communicate violations to the AICPA, we 
note that 41.2 percent (7/17) have not adopted the AICPA CPC either in whole or in part. Thus, 
not adopting the AICPA’s CPC does not preclude a state board from participating with the 
AICPA in monitoring the accounting profession at the national level.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4. Analyses
4.1. Descriptive analyses
4.1.1. State board reporting of violations
Our inquiries with state boards revealed which ones participated in directly 
communicating CPC violations to the AICPA and to what extent. While this information was 
gathered at a point-in-time (spring 2013), it was important to see if our data on violations 
reporting from the AICPA matched the feedback from the state boards. We use Figure 1 to 
broadly examine the number of unique state boards that reported violations to the AICPA (that 
resulted in disciplinary sanctions) from 2008 to 2016 along with the number of violations 
reported by those boards in each year. As shown, the number of state boards reporting 
violations ranges from the lowest level of seven in 2008 to the highest level of 21 in 2013, while 
the number of violations reported in a single year ranges from 14 in 2010 to 79 in 2014. The 
20 Colorado did not indicate the types of violations that would be reported to the AICPA due to not having a 
violation tracking mechanism in place at the time of inquiry.
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variation of boards’ reporting and number of violations reported suggest the potential for 
inconsistent and non-uniform monitoring, enforcement, and reporting under the AICPA’s CPC.
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Next, we compiled Table 3 to examine which state boards participated most in reporting 
violations from 2008 to 2016. Table 3 details the state boards that reported violations that 
resulted in AICPA sanctions under the CPC, in descending order. As shown, North Carolina 
(57) reported the most violations during this period, followed by Arizona (36) and Texas (30). 
Further, 15 state boards did not report any violations from 2008 to 2016. We also incorporated 
state population and number of CPA licenses data to determine if the number of violations 
reported was an artifact of state size. When the number of violations reported is normalized by 
the number of active CPA licenses per state, the state with the most violations reported per CPA 
is Kansas (5.504) followed by Arizona (3.595) and Alabama (3.076) (as described in Table 3, 
these figures are reported per 1,000 CPAs for more meaningful comparisons).21 Analyses in 
Table 3 suggest that violation reporting by state boards is likely impacted by factors beyond the 
state’s population and size of its accounting profession. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Given the findings from Table 3, we next compiled a geographic representation of the 
number of violations reported to identify potential regional differences. Figure 2 is a heat map 
of the U.S. population per the 2010 U.S. Census overlaid by the number of violations reported 
by each state board for the period of 2008 to 2016 (note that Alaska and Hawaii did not report 
21 Although AICPA membership data is not publicly available by state, we also include state population data from 
the 2010 U.S. Census (United States Census Bureau, 2010), as discussions with the AICPA indicate that state 
population is a valid proxy for relative AICPA membership by state. A separate ranking per capita by state 
population is not provided given the correlation between the number of active CPA licenses and state population (r 
= 0.935, p < 0.001, two-tailed; ρ = 0.951, p < 0.001, two-tailed).
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any violations during this period). Our visual inspection does not reveal any apparent regional 
differences in the reporting of violations.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
4.1.2. State boards’ adoption of the AICPA CPC
As previously described, the primary question in our study is to what extent a state 
board’s reporting of violations to the AICPA is associated with the degree of adoption of the 
AICPA’s CPC. As shown in Table 1, states can fully (16), partially (15), or not adopt (19) the 
AICPA’s CPC. If a state board fully or partially adopts the AICPA’s CPC, there is an implicit 
obligation for that board to report known violations of the CPC to the AICPA. State boards that 
do not adopt do not have this obligation and are likely to be less engaged with the AICPA’s 
efforts to monitor accounting professionals’ ethical conduct and to centrally aggregate 
misconduct issues. We use a bubble chart in Figure 3 to examine this relationship between the 
number of violations reported (bubble size) and the degree of AICPA CPC adoption by a state 
(bubble shade). It is apparent that states reporting the most violations have not fully adopted the 
AICPA’s CPC.22 Additional analyses reveal that the 16 state boards with full adoption 
collectively reported 50 violations from 2008 to 2016, meaning that 32 percent (16/50) of the 
states reported only 14 percent (50/358) of the total violations. This stands in contrast to 30 
percent (15/50) of state boards with partial adoption that reported 50.3 percent (180/358) of the 
violations, and the 38 percent (19/50) of state boards that have not adopted and still report 35.7 
percent (128/358) of the violations. These findings suggest that a full adoption of the AICPA’s 
CPC is not associated with higher levels of violation reporting.
22 Specifically, North Carolina reported 57 violations with partial adoption of the AICPA’s CPC, Arizona reported 
36 violations with no adoption, Texas reported 30 violations with partial adoption, California reported 25 violations 
with no adoption, and Kansas reported 22 violations with partial adoption.
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[Insert Figure 3 about here]
We compiled Table 4 to more closely examine our data when aggregated by the state 
boards’ degree of AICPA CPC adoption. As shown, the extent of violations reported by states 
with full adoption appears to lag that of states with partial or no adoption across most 
categories. Specifically, states with full adoption reported the fewest violations both in total 
(Full = 50, Partial = 180, Not = 128) and when averaged by the number of states in that 
adoption group (Full = 3.125, Partial = 12.000, No Adoption = 6.737).23 Given our inquiries 
with the state boards, states with full adoption also directly communicate the least often, and the 
fewest types of violations, to the AICPA.24 Based on these results, it appears that state boards 
that have fully adopted the AICPA’s CPC are less engaged in helping the AICPA monitor the 
conduct of accounting professionals than states that have partially or not adopted the AICPA 
CPC.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.1.3. State boards’ adoption status, violations reporting, and financial constraints
As an extension of the previous analysis, we compiled Figure 4 to visualize the 
relationships between CPC adoption status, violation reporting, and financial constraints. As 
shown in Figure 4, we again aggregated state boards by AICPA CPC adoption status, and then 
within each adoption status sorted the boards by the number of violations reported from 2008 to 
2016. We then added three columns showing the average state board operating budget from 
2008 to 2016 (for the 39 states that we obtained some/all of these budgets), the average 
23 This pattern also persists when the number of violations is normalized by the number of active CPA licenses in a 
state (Full = 0.409, Partial = 0.829, No Adoption = 0.462) (note - results are per 1,000 active CPAs).
24 We also find that CPAs who are licensed by state boards that have fully adopted the AICPA’s CPC report CPE 
least frequently (Full = 2.500 years, Partial = 2.286 years, No Adoption = 1.947 years) and pay the lowest average 
annualized fees for licensure (Full = $99.51, Partial = $123.89, No Adoption = $135.42).
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operating budget per active CPA license, and the annualized fee for CPA licensure.25 Of the 39 
states presented, California, Texas, and Washington have the highest average annual operating 
budgets, while Wyoming, Arkansas, and Alaska have the highest average annual operating 
budget per active CPA license. States with full adoption have noticeably smaller operating 
budgets than states that have either partially or not adopted the AICPA CPC, and this appears to 
remain the case when the operating budget is normalized by the number of active CPA licenses 
in a state. Correlation analyses confirm this observation, as we note a significant negative 
correlation between operating budget and degree of AICPA CPC adoption (r = - 0.179, p < 
0.001, two-tailed; ρ = - 0.175, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Finally, annual licensure fees appear to be 
higher, on average, for states with partial adoption. Based on these observations, states with full 
adoption have smaller operating budgets, which is consistent with the proposition that fully 
adopting an established CPC, such as the AICPA CPC, may be a cost-effective strategy for state 
boards with lower operating budgets (cf. Clements et al. 2009).
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Our descriptive analyses reveal several important observations. First, there appears to be 
inconsistent and non-uniform monitoring, enforcement, and reporting by state boards of 
accountancy under the AICPA’s CPC (Figure 1). The number of violations reported by state 
boards does not appear to be merely an artifact of the number of CPAs in a state or the state 
population (Table 3). There also does not appear to be regional differences in the reporting of 
violations (Figure 2). State boards that partially adopt the AICPA’s CPC report the most 
violations (Figures 3 and 4), while states with full adoption appear to have smaller operating 
25 We could not identify operating budgets for any year from 2008 to 2016 for the following states, and they have 
therefore been removed from this analysis: Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin.
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budgets (Figure 4). Finally, states with full adoption appear to be less engaged in helping the 
AICPA monitor the conduct of accounting professionals than states that have partially or not 
adopted the AICPA CPC (Table 4).
4.2. Correlation analyses
While the descriptive analyses in the previous section consider targeted relationships 
among our variables, we provide a complete correlation matrix in Table 5 (all variables are 
defined in Appendix A). Beyond the correlations already described, we note significant positive 
correlations between the number of CPA licenses per state (ACTIVE_CPA_LIC) and (1) the 
2010 U.S. Population by state (2010_POP) (r = 0.935, p < 0.001, two-tailed; ρ = 0.951, p < 
0.001, two-tailed), and (2) the number of public company headquarters in each state 
(PUBLIC_HQ) (r = 0.876, p < 0.001, two-tailed; ρ = 0.930, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Not 
surprisingly, 2010_POP and PUBLIC_HQ are also highly correlated (r = 0.896, p < 0.001, two-
tailed; ρ = 0.878, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Furthermore, we find a significant positive correlation 
between which violations state boards directly communicate to the AICPA (WHICH_VIOS) and 
the frequency with which violations are directly communicated (RPT_FREQ) (r = 0.799, p < 
0.001, two-tailed; ρ = 0.941, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Considering the relationships among our 
variables and the possible influences of state / state board attributes, we develop a model to 
explain variation in the number of violations that state boards report to the AICPA.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
4.3. Model for variation in violations reported
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The model we developed to explain variation in the number of violations that state 
boards report to the AICPA uses generalized least squares (GLS) and random effects, and is 
defined as follows (all variables are defined in Appendix A):26
VIOS_RPTDs,t = β0 + β1CPC_ADOPTs + β2OPER_BUDs,t + β3ACTIVE_CPA_LICs + 
β4AICPA_OFFICEs + β5WHICH_VIOSs + β6REQ_PUB_ACCTs,t + 
β7PUBLIC_HQs,t + β8STATE_GDP_PER_CAPs,t  + YEAR + εs,t
(1)
As shown, we analyze several possible influences on the number of CPC violations reported by 
state boards and cluster our panel data by STATE. Analyzed variables include: (1) whether state 
board (s) has fully, partially, or not adopted the AICPA CPC (CPC_ADOPT), (2) the operating 
budget for state board (s) in year (t) (OPER_BUD), (3) the number of active CPA licenses in 
state (s) in 2016 (ACTIVE_CPA_LIC), (4) whether the AICPA maintains an office in state (s) 
(AICPA_OFFICE), (5) the severity of violations that state board (s) directly communicates to 
the AICPA (WHICH_VIOS), (6) whether state board (s) requires public accounting experience 
for licensure, or allows for fewer years if the work experience is in public accounting 
(REQ_PUB_ACCT), and (7) the number of public company headquarters in state (s) for year (t) 
(PUBLIC_HQ). Further, we control for varying economic conditions with state (s) GDP per 
capita in year (t) (ST_GDP_PER_CAP), as well as the YEAR. Results are presented in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Our model explains a meaningful portion of the variation in VIOS_RPTD with an R2 of 
0.2492. ACTIVE_CPA_LIC (p = 0.022, two-tailed), AICPA _OFFICE (p = 0.054, two-tailed) 
26 Similar to studies that have firms appear multiple times in a sample, unique state boards of accountancy can 
appear in each year of our sample. As such, for our primary analyses, we cluster the data by STATE and use 
random effects generalized least squares models (GLS) (cf. Yezegel, 2015). This approach produces standard errors 
that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, both of which are common issues with panel data such as 
ours (Hoechle, 2007).
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and WHICH_VIOS (p = 0.003, two-tailed) all carry significant positive coefficients, while 
ST_GDP_PER_CAP (p = 0.040, two-tailed) carries a significant negative coefficient.
A priori, it would be intuitive to expect that a fuller adoption of the AICPA’s CPC 
would explain higher levels of state boards’ reporting of violations to the AICPA (given the 
implicit obligation of adopters to report). However, our descriptive analyses reveal that states 
with partial adoption report the most violations, and thus there is not a linear relationship 
between CPC_ADOPT and VIOS_RPTD. Consequently, state board adoption status of the 
AICPA’s CPC is not significant in our model. Further, the finding that the AICPA’s presence 
leads to more reporting by state boards is revealing, in that the AICPA might have more 
opportunities to work closely with these state boards to promote their goal of centrally 
monitoring the accounting profession. Finally, it is interesting to note that the AICPA maintains 
offices in North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, and Washington D.C., none of which have 
fully adopted the AICPA’s CPC (as of July 2015).27
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we examined the extent to which a state board’s reporting of violations to 
the AICPA is associated with the degree of adoption of the AICPA’s CPC. We find that a fuller 
adoption of the AICPA’s CPC is not associated with higher levels of violation reporting, and in 
fact, state boards that more fully adopted the AICPA’s CPC appear to be less engaged in 
monitoring particularly when compared to states with partial adoption. While previous studies 
have found that states focus on their own interests over the profession’s national interests (e.g., 
27 Our inquiries with the AICPA indicate that four states proactively report violations through direct 
communications to the AICPA: Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin. We therefore removed these four states 
and re-ran our models. Our results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. 
24
Bishop and Tondkar, 1987; Backof and Martin, 1991), ours is the only study of which we are 
aware that examines the degree of state board participation as part of the AICPA’s efforts to 
monitor the conduct of accounting professionals at the national level. Our analyses reveal 
variables that help explain the violation reporting practices of state boards of accountancy.
State boards of accountancy are uniquely positioned to identify and report violations of 
accounting professionals under the AICPA’s CPC. Indeed, the AICPA loses a large amount of 
information and insight when data on violations are not adequately collected and reported. Such 
information is critical for designing continuing education programs, allocating appropriate 
resources to monitoring and enforcement activities, revising the CPC to address contemporary 
issues, modifying the CPA exam, and in serving as a centralized resource for members making 
ethical and technical decisions. Users of accounting information are also at risk when regulatory 
bodies charged with overseeing the profession do not adequately monitor accountants’ conduct 
or routinely and openly report identified issues with the AICPA. As such, we believe the 
AICPA should more strongly emphasize to state boards the importance of their reporting CPC 
violations. 
Our finding that states which fully adopt the AICPA’s CPC report fewer violations than 
other states may lead some to question the AICPA’s preeminence in setting behavioral 
standards for accounting professionals. Notwithstanding the AICPA’s national role, perhaps 
states which develop their own codes of conduct or supplement that of the AICPA have more 
developed codes of conduct than the AICPA itself. We encourage future research that examines 
this issue. Further, given our challenges in collecting and analyzing state board operating 
budgets, we believe boards should provide greater budgetary transparency such as including 
amounts allocated to board activities (i.e., monitoring and enforcement of the CPC). This 
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disclosure transparency appears appropriate considering state boards receive (partial) funding 
from public dollars, and in light of the impact funding has on violation reporting identified in 
our study.
Finally, our inquiries with the state boards of accountancy reveal that violations such as 
those reported in this study are now commonly submitted to the Accountancy Licensee 
Database (ALD) as provided by NASBA.28 By submitting violations to the ALD, state boards 
may feel a level of reporting redundancy when notifying the AICPA of the same issues. 
Although the development of NASBA’s ALD was intended to serve as a clearinghouse, one 
possible implication is reporting fragmentation of CPC violations. Thus, it is unclear whether 
any single authoritative body has a complete picture of trending CPA behaviors. Furthermore, 
the ALD is held-out as a central repository for state board reporting; however, Jenkins et al. 
(2018) show that a substantial portion of reported member violations originates from parties 
other than state boards of accountancy. Focusing only on state board reporting may limit the 
collection of important information. Consequently, we encourage the AICPA to work with 
NASBA to fully leverage its ALD in monitoring accounting professionals’ conduct throughout 
the U.S. and as a means to identify emerging behavioral issues and trends.
More progress is needed in the central collection of CPC violations and reporting of 
member sanctions. While adoption of a CPC is a decision that is currently made by each state 
board, it is important that one body (e.g., AICPA or NASBA) has access to a complete picture 
of patterns of behaviors of accounting professionals across the U.S. This requires participation 
from many interested parties, and is only successful when these parties work in tandem towards 
28 NASBA describes its Accountancy Licensee Database as “a central repository of current licensee and firm 
information. It was conceptualized to assist boards of accountancy with their regulatory mission” (NASBA, 
2018b). 
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a common goal. Without a high degree of inter-state and cross-entity efforts and cooperation, 
the profession is left to be reactive as opposed to proactive in addressing emerging problems.
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Figure 1
Number of Violations Reported by State Boards and Number of Unique State Boards Reporting Violations 
Per Year
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Figure 2
U.S. Population overlaid by the Number of Violations Reported by State Boards from 2008 to 2016
This figure presents a heat map of the U.S. population as of the 2010 census (2010_POP) overlaid by the number 
of CPC violations reported by state boards of accountancy to the AICPA from 2008 to 2016 (VIOS_RPTD). See 
variables defined in Appendix A.
Not pictured: Alaska and Hawaii did not have any violations reported during this period.
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Figure 3
Violations Reported by State Boards (2008-2016) and Level of AICPA CPC Adoption (2015)
This figure presents the state board adoption status of the AICPA’s CPC (CPC_ADOPT) (darker = fuller adoption) 
along with the number of violations reported by state boards to the AICPA from 2008 to 2016 (VIOS_RPTD) 
(larger bubbles = more violations). Numbers shown in the bubbles reflect the number of violations reported by the 
respective state board. See variables defined in Appendix A.
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Figure 4
AICPA CPC Adoption Status, Violations Reported, Operating Budget, and Annual CPA License Fee
This figure presents state boards bucketed by AICPA CPC adoption status (as provided in Table 1), then sorts the 
boards by the number of violations reported to the AICPA (VIOS_RPTD) within each adoption bucket. For states 
that we were able to obtain some/all operating budgets for from 2008 to 2016 (OPER_BUD before dividing by 
100), we then show the average annual state board operating budget followed by the average annual operating 
budget per active CPA license (ACTIVE_CPA_LIC). The following states were removed from this analysis as we 
could not obtain any operating budget information: Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin. Finally, we present the average annual fee for active 
CPA licensees (ANNUAL_FEE). See variables defined in Appendix A.
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Table 1
State Board Adoption Status of the AICPA CPC as of July 2015
 Not Adopted  Full Adoption  Partial Adoption  
 Alabama  Delaware  Alaska  
 Arizona  Idaho  Colorado  
 Arkansas  Indiana  Kansas  
 California  Maine  Nevada  
 Connecticut  Michigan  New Jersey  
 Florida  Minnesota  North Carolina  
 Georgia  Missouri  Ohio  
 Hawaii  New Hampshire  Oregon  
 Illinois  New Mexico  Pennsylvania  
 Iowa  North Dakota  Tennessee  
 Kentucky  Oklahoma  Texas  
 Louisiana  Rhode Island  Vermont  
 Maryland  South Carolina  Washington  
 Massachusetts  South Dakota  Wisconsin  
 Mississippi  Utah  Wyoming  
 Montana  Virginia    
 Nebraska     
 New York     
 West Virginia      
This table presents the status of state boards adopting the AICPA CPC based on information provided by the AICPA as of July 2015. Boards in 
the "Not Adopted" category have not adopted the CPC, while those in "Full Adoption" have adopted the CPC in its entirety. Boards with 
"Partial Adoption" have either adopted (1) sections of the CPC or (2) the entire CPC with exceptions.
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Table 2
State Boards Purporting to Directly Communicate Code of Professional Conduct (CPC) Violations to the 
AICPA
       
  Results of Independent Inquiries   
  
Does the board 
periodically directly 
communicate CPC 
violations to the AICPA?
Frequency with which 
CPC violations are 
directly communicated 
to the AICPA
Which CPC violations 
are directly 
communicated to the 
AICPA?
Did State Board Report 
Violations (i.e., Directly 
Communicate or Make 
Available) to the AICPA 
from 2008 to 2016?  
 Alabama  Yes  As Occur  All Yes  
 Arizona  Yes  Monthly  All Yes  
 California  Yes  Bi-Monthly  All Yes  
 Colorado  Yes  As Occur  Unknown Yes  
 Idaho  Yes  Quarterly  All Yes  
 Kansas  Yes  As Occur  All Yes  
 Kentucky  Yes  Every Other Year  Comm>NoEdu Yes  
 Louisiana  Yes  As Occur  Comm.Disc No  
 Nebraska  Yes  Every Three Years  Comm.Serious No  
 North Carolina  Yes  As Occur  Comm.Rev/Sus Yes  
 South Carolina  Yes  As Occur  Comm>Admin Yes  
 Tennessee  Yes  Quarterly  Comm>Admin Yes  
 Vermont  Yes  As Occur  All No  
 Washington  Yes  Quarterly  Comm>Admin Yes  
 Wyoming  Yes  As Occur  Comm.Suspen Yes  
 Nevada  Yes.1  As Occur  Comm>Admin Yes  
 Montana  Yes.2  As Occur  Comm.Disc No  
       
       
This table presents the results of our outreach to the state boards of accountancy (or equivalent body for states without a "state board of 
accountancy"). Only boards that indicated some level of directly communicating CPC violations to the AICPA are included in this table (i.e., 
those not listed indicated that they do not directly communicate CPC violations to the AICPA). For those boards directly communicating 
violations, we also inquired as to the frequency with which CPC violations are directly communicated to the AICPA and which CPC violations 
are communicated. Inquiries were performed primarily during March and April of 2013. Note that after repeated attempts, we failed to receive 
responses to our inquiries from Illinois and New Jersey; as such, the results presented in this table do not make any conclusions as to the 
communications practices of these two state boards.
Yes.1: Yes, if the state board is aware that the violation was committed by a member of the AICPA.
Yes.2: Only in certain situations.
As Occur: Violations are directly communicated by the state board to the AICPA as they occur (i.e., not on a defined reporting frequency).
Monthly: Violations are directly communicated by the state board on a monthly basis.
Bi-Monthly: Violations are directly communicated by the state board after bi-monthly board meetings.
Quarterly: Violations are directly communicated by the state board on a quarterly basis.
Every Other Year: Violations are directly communicated by the state board every-other year.
Every Three Years: Violations are directly communicated by the state board every three years.
All: All disciplinary actions are directly communicated to the AICPA by the state board.
Comm.Rev/Sus: All disciplinary actions that result in the revocation or suspension of a certificate are directly communicated to the AICPA by 
the state board.
Comm>Admin: All disciplinary actions except administrative actions are directly communicated to the AICPA by the state board.
Comm>NoEdu: All disciplinary actions except continuing education violations are directly communicated to the AICPA by the state board.
Comm.Serious: Only those violations deemed "serious" by the state board are directly communicated to the AICPA.
Comm.Suspen: Only those violations that result in suspensions are directly communicated to the AICPA.
Comm.Disc: The state board maintains discretion as to which violations it chooses to directly communicate to the AICPA.
Unknown: The respondent could not provide feedback considering the lack of a tracking mechanism in place.
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Table 3
Analysis of Violations Reported by State Boards for the period 2008 to 2016
State Board 
Reporting Violation
Active CPA Licensees 
in 2016
(per NASBA)1
2010 Population
(per U.S. Census 
Bureau)
 Count % Count % Population %
Violations by 
Reporting 
Jurisdiction per 
1,000 Licensees2
Rank
North Carolina 57 15.9% 20,794 3.5% 9,535,483 3.1% 2.741 4
Arizona 36 10.1% 10,014 1.7% 6,392,017 2.1% 3.595 2
Texas 30 8.4% 57,947 9.7% 25,145,561 8.2% 0.518 15
California 25 7.0% 55,330 9.2% 37,253,956 12.1% 0.452 18
Kansas 22 6.1% 3,997 0.7% 2,853,118 0.9% 5.504 1
Alabama 21 5.9% 6,826 1.1% 4,779,736 1.6% 3.076 3
Tennessee 17 4.7% 10,682 1.8% 6,346,105 2.1% 1.591 8
New York 14 3.9% 55,549 9.3% 19,378,102 6.3% 0.252 28
Missouri 12 3.4% 11,370 1.9% 5,988,927 1.9% 1.055 9
Oregon 12 3.4% 7,018 1.2% 3,831,074 1.2% 1.710 7
Illinois 11 3.1% 20,585 3.4% 12,830,632 4.2% 0.534 13
Washington 11 3.1% 18,238 3.0% 6,724,540 2.2% 0.603 12
Florida 10 2.8% 31,179 5.2% 18,801,310 6.1% 0.321 25
Indiana 10 2.8% 9,849 1.6% 6,483,802 2.1% 1.015 10
New Jersey 3 10 2.8% 19,055 3.2% 8,791,894 2.9% 0.525 14
Pennsylvania 9 2.5% 25,176 4.2% 12,702,379 4.1% 0.357 22
Utah 7 2.0% 2,763,885 0.9%
Virginia 7 2.0% 26,127 4.4% 8,001,024 2.6% 0.268 27
Ohio 5 1.4% 32,004 5.3% 11,536,504 3.7% 0.156 31
Michigan 4 1.1% 12,322 2.1% 9,883,640 3.2% 0.325 24
Oklahoma 4 1.1% 10,717 1.8% 3,751,351 1.2% 0.373 21
Massachusetts 3 0.8% 18,658 3.1% 6,547,629 2.1% 0.161 30
Nevada 3 0.8% 3,225 0.5% 2,700,551 0.9% 0.930 11
South Dakota 3 0.8% 1,206 0.2% 814,180 0.3% 2.488 6
Colorado 2 0.6% 15,884 2.6% 5,029,196 1.6% 0.126 33
Iowa 2 0.6% 4,646 0.8% 3,046,355 1.0% 0.430 20
Mississippi 2 0.6% 3,905 0.7% 2,967,297 1.0% 0.512 16
Wyoming 2 0.6% 783 0.1% 563,626 0.2% 2.554 5
Arkansas 1 0.3% 3,578 0.6% 2,915,918 0.9% 0.279 26
Connecticut 1 0.3% 7,139 1.2% 3,574,097 1.2% 0.140 32
Idaho 1 0.3% 2,799 0.5% 1,567,582 0.5% 0.357 23
Kentucky 1 0.3% 8,226 1.4% 4,339,367 1.4% 0.122 34
Maine 1 0.3% 2,054 0.3% 1,328,361 0.4% 0.487 17
South Carolina 1 0.3% 5,826 1.0% 4,625,364 1.5% 0.172 29
West Virginia 1 0.3% 2,287 0.4% 1,852,994 0.6% 0.437 19
Σ Other Jurisdictions 4 - 0.0% 74,506 12.4% 42,496,258 13.8%
 358 100% 599,501 100% 308,143,815 100%   
This table presents the number of violations reported by state boards that resulted in AICPA sanctions under its CPC for the period of 2008 to 
2016. Active CPA Licensees and 2010 Population data have also been provided to serve as a relative benchmark for the number of violations 
reported. Further, the Active CPA Licensees is used to form a per-capita measure of violations reported to demonstrate the difference between 
raw counts of the reporting state board and the actual rate of violations given the number of CPAs.
1 This data was not available for Utah, Delaware, or Wisconsin.
2 Calculated as the Count from the "State Board Reporting Violation" divided by the Count from the "Active CPA Licenses in 2016", then 
multiplied by 1,000.
3 New Jersey reported the results for an audit of practitioner continuing professional education (CPE) compliance during 2013, which included 
146 sanctions related to CPE adherence. These 146 CPE sanctions are not reflected in this nor any table included in this study so as to maintain 
focus on the more typical trends and patterns in the nature of sanctions and reporting practices.
4 State boards with zero violations reported, as indicated in the "State Board Reporting Violation" column, were collapsed into this Σ Other State 
Boards record entry and include: Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin.
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Table 4
Summary Descriptive Statistics Bucketed by State Board Level of AICPA CPC Adoption
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Full 16 50 3.125 105,152 0.409 0.563 0.875 2.063 1.625 2.500 1.583 $         99.51
Partial 15 180 12.000 217,193 0.829 2.800 3.000 2.867 1.933 2.286 1.533 $      123.89
Not 19 128 6.737 277,156 0.462 1.895 2.158 1.474 1.684 1.947 1.553 $      135.42
This table presents summary descriptive statistics bucketed by state boards’ of accountancy degree of AICPA CPC adoption. Many column headings appear as variable names described in this study 
(i.e., the italicized headings), which are defined in Appendix A. For the remaining headings: “State Board Count” represents the number of state boards of accountancy with the respective degree of 
AICPA CPC adoption; “Average Number of Violations Reported” is the result of VIOS_RPTD divided by State Board Count; “Violations per Active CPA License (x1,000)” represents VIOS_RPTD 
divided by ACTIVE_CPA_LIC, multiplied by 1,000 for ease of comparison (note, we did not obtain ACTIVE_CPA_LIC for Utah, Delaware, or Wisconsin, and therefore removed the violations reported 
by these states from VIOS_RPTD when calculating this number, which resulted in 43 violations being used for VIOS_RPTD for states with full adoption). Also note that we could not obtain 
CPE_RPT_PRD for Wisconsin, and it is therefore not included in the calculation of this cell for full adopters.
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Table 5
Pearson and Spearman Correlations
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
1.000 0.312 0.294 0.314 -0.067 0.281 0.185 0.221 0.233 -0.064 -0.107 0.197 0.033 -0.079 0.024 -0.074
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.022 0.000 0.476 0.092 0.605 0.113(1) VIOS_RPTD
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.230 1.000 0.639 0.772 -0.179 0.307 0.182 -0.026 0.663 -0.133 -0.147 0.309 0.125 0.024 -0.049 -0.031
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.585 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.601 0.295 0.502(2) OPER_BUD
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.376 0.333 1.000 0.935 -0.178 -0.069 -0.166 0.258 0.876 -0.099 -0.160 0.146 0.068 -0.008 0.286 0.023
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.001 0.002 0.158 0.874 0.000 0.639(3) ACITVE_CPA_LIC
432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
0.400 0.290 0.951 1.000 -0.238 0.064 -0.073 0.152 0.896 -0.136 -0.168 0.117 0.083 -0.031 0.229 -0.045
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.120 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.012 0.076 0.512 0.000 0.338(4) 2010_POP
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.043 -0.175 -0.114 -0.199 1.000 -0.150 -0.189 -0.147 -0.292 -0.143 0.055 0.206 0.003 0.300 -0.034 -0.147
0.353 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.241 0.000 0.947 0.000 0.472 0.002(5) CPC_ADOPT
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.203 0.343 -0.132 -0.060 -0.187 1.000 0.799 -0.021 0.011 -0.032 0.143 0.211 -0.029 -0.204 -0.134 -0.219
0.000 0.000 0.006 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.660 0.806 0.491 0.002 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.004 0.000(6) WHICH_VIOS
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.135 0.302 -0.191 -0.127 -0.199 0.941 1.000 -0.024 -0.095 -0.042 0.158 0.176 -0.046 -0.127 -0.285 -0.203
0.004 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.609 0.041 0.365 0.001 0.000 0.330 0.006 0.000 0.000(7) RPT_FREQ
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.200 -0.132 0.207 0.149 -0.142 -0.046 -0.041 1.000 0.226 -0.020 -0.003 -0.008 0.041 -0.164 0.208 0.504
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.320 0.382 0.000 0.674 0.944 0.870 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000(8) AICPA_OFFICE
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.333 0.217 0.930 0.878 -0.200 -0.123 -0.171 0.209 1.000 -0.019 -0.119 0.100 0.103 -0.039 0.293 0.094
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.681 0.011 0.033 0.028 0.399 0.000 0.043(9) PUBLIC_HQ
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.078 -0.008 -0.318 -0.255 -0.167 0.136 0.135 -0.159 -0.256 1.000 -0.029 0.079 0.030 -0.127 0.077 0.085
0.097 0.862 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.539 0.089 0.520 0.006 0.100 0.068(10) ANNUAL_FEE
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.080 -0.107 -0.208 -0.153 0.065 0.138 0.162 -0.003 -0.142 0.087 1.000 0.225 -0.126 -0.195 -0.044 -0.029
0.088 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.164 0.003 0.000 0.944 0.002 0.062 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.352 0.533(11) REQ_PUB_ACCT
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.192 0.312 0.169 0.126 0.184 0.170 0.138 0.053 0.174 -0.004 0.215 1.000 -0.127 0.184 -0.065 -0.041
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.254 0.000 0.937 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.168 0.386(12) ETHICS_EXAM
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.010 0.046 0.049 0.029 0.075 -0.032 -0.054 0.032 0.157 0.027 -0.095 -0.069 1.000 -0.033 -0.019 0.059
0.823 0.330 0.305 0.531 0.111 0.489 0.245 0.497 0.001 0.564 0.042 0.142 0.478 0.690 0.211(13) AVG_ETHICS_HRS
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.052 0.042 -0.007 -0.065 0.330 -0.209 -0.161 -0.161 -0.075 -0.049 -0.157 0.213 -0.113 1.000 0.156 0.047
0.265 0.367 0.882 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.107 0.295 0.001 0.000 0.015  0.001 0.318(14) CPE_RPT_PRD
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
0.100 -0.266 0.326 0.309 -0.050 -0.159 -0.248 0.186 0.378 -0.028 -0.048 -0.051 -0.005 0.106 1.000 0.167
0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.550 0.303 0.273 0.919 0.023  0.000(15) LIC_RENEW_PRD
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
-0.023 -0.172 0.154 -0.001 -0.051 -0.305 -0.284 0.277 0.282 0.115 0.014 0.256 0.086 0.202 0.315 1.000
0.617 0.000 0.001 0.976 0.272 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.757 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000  (16) ST_GDP_PER_CAP
459 459 432 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
Reported: Pearson (top-right) and Spearman (bottom-left) correlations, p-values (two-tailed), and sample size. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 6
Multivariate Results
  Coefficient Z-Stat
P-Value
(2-tailed)  
VIOS_RPTD  
CPC_ADOPT 0.05584 0.43 0.668
OPER_BUD 0.00001 0.93 0.351  
ACTIVE_CPA_LIC 0.00004 2.29 0.022
AICPA_OFFICE 1.93465 1.93 0.054  
WHICH_VIOS 0.16587 2.98 0.003  
REQ_PUB_ACCT (0.46603) (1.80) 0.071  
PUBLIC_HQ (0.00098) (0.93) 0.352  
STATE_GDP_PER_CAP (0.00002) (2.06) 0.040
YEAR 0.87686 2.86 0.004  
Intercept (175.710) (2.86) 0.004  
 
Panel Variable State  
Observations 432  
R2 0.2492  
   
The model presented uses generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects, and has STATE set as the panel variable. Defining the variable as 
such helps address concerns of autocorrelation with panel data. The model also incorporates standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007). Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Appendix A
Variable Definitions
   
Variable  Definition
VIOS_RPTD  The number of violations reported by a state board of accountancy to the AICPA that 
lead to sanctions under the AICPA CPC in year (t) and state (s).
OPER_BUD The state board of accountancy operating budget divided by 100 for year (t) and state (s).
ACITVE_CPA_LIC Active CPA licenses in state (s) during the year 2016 (per NASBA).
2010_POP  The populations of state (s) per the 2010 U.S. Census.
CPC_ADOPT  Ordinal variable for whether state (s) has not adopted (0), partially adopted (1), or fully 
adopted (2) the AICPA CPC as their own.
WHICH_VIOS  Ordinal variable for which violations state board (s) claims to directly communicate to 
the AICPA, as detailed in Table 2: (8) All, (7) Comm.Rev/Sus, (6) Comm>Admin, (5) 
Comm>NoEdu, (4) Comm.Serious, (3) Comm.Suspen, (2) Comm.Disc, (1) Unknown, 
and (0) Do Not Directly Communicate.
RPT_FREQ  Ordinal variable for the frequency at which state board (s) claims to directly 
communicate violations to the AICPA, as detailed in Table 2: (6) As Occur, (5) Monthly, 
(4) Bi-Monthly, (3) Quarterly, (2) Every Other Year, (1) Every Three Years, and (0) Do 
Not Report.
AICPA_OFFICE  Dummy variable that indicates whether the AICPA has an office in state (s) (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes). The AICPA maintains offices in North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, and 
Washington D.C.
PUBLIC_HQ The number of public companies headquartered in state (s) in year (t).
ANNUAL_FEE Annual CPA licensing fee in state (s) as of the year 2019. If a state charges the licensing 
fee for multiple years at a time, this number represents the annual average fee.
REQ_PUB_ACCT Dummy variable for whether state (s) requires public accounting experience or allows for 
fewer years of experience if it is gained in public accounting (0 = No, 1 = Yes) as of the 
year 2017.
ETHICS_EXAM Ordinal variable for the level of control a state board asserts over the ethics exam content 
that the board of accountancy in state (s) requires for new CPAs: (4) state-specific ethics 
exam, (3) AICPA Ethics Exam, (2) AICPA Ethics Exam or an exam approved by the 
state board, (1) an ethics exam approved by the state board, or (0) no ethics exam is 
required.
AVG_ETHICS_HRS Average number of ethics CPE hours required by state (s) as of the year 2017.
CPE_RPT_PRD The number of years state (s) allows between reporting CPEs, as of the year 2017.
LIC_RENEW_PRD The number of years state (s) allows between CPA license renewals, as of the year 2017.
ST_GDP_PER_CAP Gross domestic product per capita for state (s) in year (t).
YEAR  Year from the sample period.
STATE  State board associated with the data record.
